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In this paper we examine the Duty of Care concept as it may be applied to land 
management in Australia. We show that the efficiency case for extending the 
Duty of Care owed by farmers to correct off-farm environmental costs is 
weak. The economic issues of what conservation should be carried out and 
who should carry out the conservation need not be linked to the subjective 
question of who should pay. Where transaction costs are high, significant costs 
may be created by following notions of Polluter Pays rather than following the 
principle of equating marginal costs of conservation across all sources with the 
marginal benefits of conservation. Where transaction costs are low, the 
socially optimal level of conservation can be achieved when one party is made 








Australian farmers, and private land-owners in general, face a range of external 
controls or legal restrictions over the way they use natural resources. They are bound 
by common law that provides for a wide-ranging Duty of Care (DofC) to avoid 
injuring other people or their property
1. In addition, farmers have obligations under 
the various state environmental protection acts that govern the actions of all 
industries. Over and above these general obligations farmers also face specific 
controls specified in various State land protection acts, and those who operate on 
crown pastoral leases confront a further array of land use controls that vary between 
states and territories (Productivity Commission, 2002). 
 
Despite the extent of the existing explicit legal obligations imposed on farmers, there 
appears to be a near consensus view that the current level of conservation and 
environmental protection undertaken on privately managed agricultural land is not 
consistent with the efficient management of the resources involved. Specifically, there 
appears to be strong agreement in policy circles that Australia as a whole is under-
investing in the conservation of important resources such as biodiversity, land quality 
                                                 
1 See Bates (2001) for a detailed analysis of the existing common law and legislative obligations of 
land managers. 
  3and water quality. In exploring ways that this deficit in conservation can be redressed 
some groups have suggested that the legal obligations of farmers to protect or 
improve the environment should be extended. In general terms they argue that the 
current legal DofC that farmers and other land managers have to prevent damage to 
the natural resource base is too limited and should be extended by statute law. 
 
For example, the then Industry Commission (1997) argued that the extended DofC, 
“… should require those responsible to take all reasonable and practical steps 
to prevent harm to the environment” (p.75)  
More recently, SCEH (2001), the Wentworth Group (2002), VCMC/DSE (2003) and 
Young et al. (2003) have discussed the possibility of redefining and extending the 
legal land management obligations of farmers. 
 
Interest in redefining and extending the DofC of farmers to the environment stems 
from the need to establish rules as to who should pay for society’s increasing demands 
for environmental services. There is also a view that the existing legal obligations do 
not obligate farmers to pay a high enough share of the potential future costs of 
protecting the environment. It has been variously argued that the existing share of the 
legal obligation to protect the environment that farmers currently face provides the 
wrong incentive messages to farmers because they are not output based, provides 
insufficient funds to achieve environmental goals and does not accord with notions of 
distributional justice (e.g., Young et al, 2003,).  
 
In exploring the case for extending the DofC that farmers and private land managers 
in general have to protect the environment there are three key issues to be addressed: 
•  Is there an economic case for extending the DofC farmers have to undertake 
on-farm? 
•  Can it be done in a workable fashion? 
•  Is the change politically acceptable? 
 
In this paper we examine the first issue.  
 
  4In Section 2 we analyse the implications of extending the DofC within an economic 
framework. By employing a Coasian framework we begin by focussing on the case 
when bargaining between participants is possible. For bargaining to be credible we 
assume that transaction costs are low and contracts can be developed to shift 
obligations between groups. We then consider the case where significant transaction 
costs are present. This analysis is based on a model constructed around strategic 
interaction between groups. In Section 3 we examine the policy implications of our 
findings and summarise our findings. 
 
2. Economic Framework 
 
While economics may offer little insight into what distributional goal is desirable it 
does clarify the environmental implications of establishing entitlements and clear 
precedents for the courts to follow. In this section we employ a simple model to 
illustrate how the allocation of liability typically assumed under DofC may yield sub-
optimal resource allocations. 
 
Our model is essentially an application of Coasian bargaining.  It is normally assumed 
that the outcome in a Coasian world that bargaining between parties will yield an 
efficient outcome. For example, suppose there are two possible outcomes A and B 
that can result from bargaining between two parties as a result of the choice of 
suitable strategies. Assuming that the two players can bargain about the choices of 
strategies (possibly including side-payments) and suppose all prefer outcome A to B. 
Then clearly, they will not conclude negotiations and settle for B since if nothing else 
can be achieved they can improve by going to A. 
 
We assume that our two players are a representative farmer and the government 
department entrusted with environmental management and protection. To keep the 
model as parsimonious as possible we assume that both players have full 
information.
2 Our focus is on how impediments to bargaining can under a particular 
allocation of liability yield a sub-optimal allocation of resources.  We consider two 
                                                 
2 In our model we ignore issues of asymmetric information – see Fraser (1995) for an analysis of how 
asymmetric information can affect a Coasian bargaining policy approach. 
  5possible scenarios: low and high transaction costs.  The importance of transaction 
costs in our model is that they introduce an impediment to Coasian bargaining such 
that the allocation of liability by the courts may lead to inefficiency. 
 
We assume that the desired level of resource management can be undertaken at 
differing costs either on-farm through the actions of individual farmers (or groups of 
farmers) or off-farm by the government department.  Both parties are seeking to 
minimise the total costs (resource management plus legal damages) of resource 
management. This is an obvious behavioural assumption for a farmer. It is also an 
appropriate assumption regarding the government department as it will also be subject 
to a limited budget.  
 
The efficient allocation of resource management effort between farmer and 
government so as to achieve the socially optimal level of resource management will 
depend on the relative marginal costs of each party. Hence, we may have one or both 
parties undertaking resource management.  In essence what is being explained is that, 
those who pay, need not be those who do. That is, who caused the damage is not 
important (this is an equity issue). Rather, it is who can provide resource management 
at least cost that concerns us in this case. Thus, in our model we initially assume that 
there is no clearly established liability rule for farmers, and resource management 
may be held to be the responsibility of farmers or the government department. 
 
2.1 Legal Obligations with Low Transaction Costs 
 
In the absence of transaction costs or low transaction costs it is normally assumed 
(i.e., a Coasian solution) that two parties with an appropriate allocation of property 
rights can trade and bargain and always obtain an outcome that will yield an 
allocation of resources equal to the social optimum. Consider the resource 
management problem case illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
{Approximate Position of Figure 1} 
 
The vertical axis denotes marginal cost and benefits in dollar terms of resource 
management while the horizontal axis indicates the extent of resource management 
  6activity that is undertaken. Resource management is broadly defined to include all 
those activities that can reduce and/or minimise resource damage associated with 
typical agricultural land use activities. For example, resource management on-farm 
might be tree planting and reduced stocking rates. Off-farm it can take the form of 
amelioration activities such as silt traps in rivers to deal with soil erosion from farm 
land or public reserves for endangered flora and fauna to protect biodiversity placed at 
risk from changes in land use patterns.  
 
The marginal cost curves of the farm sector and the public sector from undertaking 
these types of activities are MCf and MCp respectively
3.  Summing these marginal 
cost curves yields the societal least cost marginal cost curve (MCt). It is assumed that 
these curves are continuous and upward sloping reflecting diminishing returns to 
resource management activities as reflected in the increasing cost of achieving higher 
goals. 
 
The private benefits of resource management to the farm sector are reflected in the 
marginal benefit curve PMBf. This curve indicates the value to individual farmers of 
resource management activities they undertake on their own land in the absence of 
any legal sanctions or obligations. These private benefits indicate the increase in the 
net present value of the stream of benefits that flow to individual farmers from 
environmental management activities. We can assume that benefits include higher 
profits and higher land values stemming from more attractive land. Government 
conservation initiatives such as Landcare and Bushcare play an important role in 
making farmers aware of these benefits and facilitating local co-operation to 
maximise their extent and minimise their cost. 
 
The extent of existing legal obligations towards on-farm resource management is 
reflected in the social marginal benefits curve SMBp. This curve shows how the farm 
sectors’ expected legal obligations are reduced as they undertake on-farm resource 
management activities.
4 These obligations are reflected both in the case law of torts 
                                                 
3 In this paper we are assuming that public and private resource management activities are, to some 
degree at least, substitutable. The difference in marginal cost curves reflected in Figure 1 is consistent 
with them being less than perfect substitutes. 
4 The marginal benefit curves are all assumed to be downward sloping reflecting diminishing marginal 
utility from the consumption of conservation goods and services. 
  7and legislative law such as the various environmental protection acts from in state and 
federal law and are generally consistent with the environmental obligations of firms in 
other sectors of the economy. In broad terms these obligations take the form of a 
requirement to take reasonable actions to ensure that production activities do not 
directly damage the person or physical property of other members of society. 
 
The total area under the curve SMBp represents the dollar value of the expected 
liability of the farm sector, under current legislation, if the farm sector was to 
undertake no resource management. It reflects the cost of direct damage to other 
people and their property under common law as well as damage to land and water 
resources protected under specific statute law. As farmers undertake more resource 
management their expected liability declines and at any level of resource management 
the ex-ante damages are equal to the area under the SMBp curve in Figure 1 and to 
the right of the current level of resource management. SMBp is further to the right in 
Figure 1 than PMBf to capture the notion that the common law interpretation of the 
law of negligence and the current statute and regulatory controls on-farm management 
impose greater conservation obligations on farmers than the market imperative of 
profit. 
 
The MBt curve in Figure 1 represents an aggregation of SMBp plus other resource 
management benefits that flow from resource management activities. These additional 
benefits include reduced risk to biodiversity, improved scenic values and improved 
water quality in rivers. They capture environmental benefits that it is argued the 
current legal regime “fails” to deliver from the farming sector. For example the 
benefits to society from the existing controls on the clearing of native vegetation are 
captured under the SMBp curve in Figure 1.  But, the benefits to society from 
legislating that farmers increase tree planting on-farm, is outside SMBp but within 
MBt. While some of the benefits contained within SMBp would take the form of 
public goods, the area between SMBp and MBt can be assumed to be mainly public 
goods or at least private goods that are non-rival in nature.
5
 
                                                 
5 Current DofC arguments (e.g., Young et al., 2003) imply that we will impose increasing resource 
management requirements on farmers regarding land management so that the gap between SMBp and 
MBt will close. 
  8The model we have developed allows us to draw five conclusions about the issue of 
legal liability where there are no transaction costs.  
1.  In the absence of both legal obligations on either party and subsidies from the 
public sector to farms for conservation work, the farm sector would undertake 
C1 units of resource management. That is, farmers would act so as to achieve 
MCf = PMBf. How much, if any, resource management the public sector 
authorities would undertake would depend on their corporate objective 
functions. The presence of weeds and pests on public lands administered by 
government agencies demonstrates that it may not be appropriate to assume 
that government authorities will be able to or will chose to undertake a 
socially optimal level of conservation activities on their own account.  
2.  Faced with a potential set of legal obligations equal to SMBp, (the current 
legal scenario) the actions of farmers would depend on their ability to bargain 
with the public providers of conservation activities. In a Coasian world with 
low transaction costs, when farmers are able to enter into cost effective side 
deals with the public sector to undertake off-farm resource management 
activities, the farm marginal cost curve effectively falls from MCf to MCt. 
Therefore, making farmers liable for all of SMBp would induce C5 units of 
resource management with the optimal mix of on-farm and off-farm 
initiatives. Farmers would expand the total level of resource management 
activities from C1 to C5 with C3 units undertaken on-farm and they would 
have the remainder (C5-C3) undertaken off-farm. At C5, under this scenario 
MCp = MCf = MCt = SMBp. 
3.  If the farmers were not held legally liable for any off-farm implications of 
their actions, a Coasian world would produce the same outcome of C5 as long 
as the other party, the public authorities, effectively had the obligation of 
SMBp imposed upon them. The public authorities, seeking a cost effective 
outcome, would then pay farmers to undertake C3 units of the target C5 units 
of resource management on-farm.  
4.  The socially optimal level of on-farm conservation is attained when C8 units 
or resource management are undertaken or MCt=MBt. In terms of the 
situation described by Figure 1, C8 units of resource management will only be 
truly efficient if the necessary activities are divided between farmers and 
government such that C6 units of conservation are undertaken on-farm and 
  9(C8-C6) units are undertaken off-farm.
6 This can be achieved by making 
farmers liable to provide C8 units of conservation. Alternatively, a liability 
rule could be adopted such that there is no obligation on farmers to conserve at 
all, but conservation must be provided by government. There is also the 
possibility of some intermediate solution, mixed provision by farmers and 
government. So extending the resource management target from C5 to C8 
would improve efficiency but in a world with low transaction costs the issue 
of legal liability is irrelevant to both the case for extending the target and the 
mix of resource management activities between on-farm and off-farm. 
5.  To hold that one should improve the quality of rivers or air says nothing about 
who caused the damage and who should pay. Figure 1 shows the efficient 
allocation of resource management activities between farm and government 
department. This allocation does not change or depend in anyway on who 
caused the damage. Moreover it says nothing about who should pay. 
 
2.2 Legal Obligations with high transaction costs 
 
We now consider what happens to resource management when we assume there are 
high transaction costs.  By high transaction costs we mean that it is no longer possible 
for the farmer and government department to strike an agreement (i.e., Coasian 
bargaining solutions are not available) so as to allocate resource management 
activities in a socially optimal manner. Thus, there is no ability for the group that is 
held liable for resource management to enter into a contract with the other party to 
undertake resource management if they can do so at lower cost. 
 
We start by assuming that the legal duty of care has been expanded to incorporate the 
wider consequences of farm activities to the community (from SMBp to MBt in 
Figure 1). We also assume that there is ambiguity or uncertainty about how the courts 
will decide on liability
7. Following the resource management situation depicted in 
Figure 1 farmers and government will be aware that they will be potentially liable for 
off-farm damages that occur if the combined level of resource management falls 
                                                 
6 Units on the conservation axis need not be equal – i.e., c2-c1 not equal to c3-c2 
7 For example in some legal situations the courts impose liability on the party causing the damage 
while in others they take into account relative costs of avoidance and foreseeability of consequences. 
  10below the socially optimal level of C8. Under these circumstances farmers will 
determine their ex ante resource management levels in the light of their expectations 
of how much resource management they expect the government department to 
undertake and what they think the expected value of the damages will be.  The 
situation we are describing is a form of strategic interaction between farmer and 
government department.   
 
We wish to examine how a farmer will formulate his/her best response to any 
resource management strategy chosen by the government department. Formally, 
denote Rf as the reaction function of the farmer and Rp as the reaction function of the 
government department. The farmer’s reaction function summarises the relationship 
between the profit maximising planned level of resource management and the 
expectation of farmers of the likely level of resource management that will be 
undertaken by government. 
 
We can show both reaction functions graphically. This relationship between the 
reaction functions is described in Figure 2. 
 
{Approximate Position of Figure 2} 
 
On the vertical axis we have the level of resource management activity that the farmer 
will undertake and on the horizontal the level of resource management the 
government department undertakes. Both reaction functions have negative slopes 
reflecting the notion that the higher the expected level of investment in resource 
management by one party, the lower will be the resulting resource management effort 
from the other party.  
 
The point at which the Rf and Rp intersect represents the Nash equilibrium of this 
game. It is the combination of resource management effort that would leave both 
farmers and government department content that they had optimised their own 
resource management plans given the resource management efforts of the other. 
 
We can relate the Nash equilibrium shown in Figure 2 with the level of resource 
management in Figure 1. The vertical intercept term of the farmer reaction curve in 
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expectation of the liability they would confront if the government department 
undertake no resource management. In other words, if farmers were totally liable they 
would undertake C7 units of resource management. This equates to MCf = MBt in 
Figure 1. Similarly, a farmer will undertake no resource management activities if 
he/she think the government department will undertake all C8 units of resource 
management, because the liability would be fully met. This means that the farmer 
reaction curve is truncated at C8. 
 
Given the assumption that whoever is held liable for the liability has no ability to 
contract with the other party to undertake resource management, four policy 
inferences can be drawn.  
 
Proposition 1. 
If the courts impose the socially optimal level of liability on one party, and both 
parties are cost minimisers, there will be a sub-optimal level of resource management 
undertaken. 
 
If the courts impose liability upon the farmer that obliges C8 units of resource 
management the net outcome would be that only C7 units would be produced. 
Confronted with information that farmers have a liability to undertake at least 
C8 units the government department would plan to undertake no resource 
management. But as noted, the maximum level of resource management that 
farmers will undertake regardless of liability is C7. They will not expand 
resource management beyond C7 as the incremental resource management 
cost is greater than the reduction in expected incremental damages. (Expected 
damages fall as more resource management is undertaken, because both the 
chance of damages occurring and the extent of possible damages fall.) The net 
result will be a deadweight loss. The deadweight loss due to under provision 
of resource management is equal to the area ABC in Figure 1. 
 
Proposition 2. 
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government agency is altruistic rather than cost minimising the optimal level of 
resource management will result. 
 
For example, an altruistic government department facing no budget constraint 
will respond to the realisation of the farmer only undertaking C7 by 
undertaking resource management themselves. An informed and altruistic 
department would undertake C2 units of resource management and make this 
known to the farmers. Knowing this, the farmers would respond by 
undertaking C6 units of their resource management obligation, thus, yielding 
the social optimum.  
 
Proposition 3. 
Assuming common knowledge regarding costs and benefits of resource management, 
but uncertainty as to their own or the other parties legal liabilities, the socially optimal 
level and distribution of resource management will occur. 
 
From Figure 2 it can be seen that in the absence of information on the 
distribution of the liability the only stable equilibrium for this game is the 
Nash equilibrium that means that the farmer undertakes C6 units of resource 
management and the government department undertakes C8-C6 units. This is 




If the courts impose a system such that the socially optimal liability is shared between 
the two parties in such a way that one is asked to provide more care than is consistent 
with the socially optimal distribution of resource management between the two 
groups, this will result in higher than optimal resource management costs being 
incurred. 
 
Optimality implies that the marginal cost of resource management from both 
sources is equal and equivalent to the marginal benefit of resource 
management as reflected in the incremental value of the reduction in expected 
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socially optimal mix identified in Figure 1 will not meet this condition. 
 
The four propositions arise if bargaining is not possible between parties, and a 
Coasian solution is unachievable. In this case any specification of liability needs to be 
based on the principle of equating marginal costs of resource management from the 
two sources with the marginal benefit of resource management to ensure a socially 
optimal outcome. Any other allocation of the liability will either produce a sub-
optimal level of resource management and/or a higher than necessary resource 
management costs. For example, forcing farmers to pay for all resource management 
activities necessary to reduce off-farm damages to optimal levels will only be efficient 
if farm level activities are always the most cost effective way of dealing with the 
problem. If on-farm conservation is not always the best option, imposing all liabilities 
on farmers will result in a lower than optimal level of provision of services and a 
higher than necessary cost for the services that are provided. 
 
3. Policy Implications and Conclusions  
 
The models developed in Section 2 are useful in understanding the conceptual basis 
behind the extension of the existing DofC as well as providing us with an explanation 
for many of the arguments against it.  The divergence between the legal and social 
optima coupled with notions of distributive justice or polluter pays are probably 
important in motivating the current interest in extending the DofC of farmers.  
 
The appropriate policy response to this divergence between private and social returns 
from resource management activities depends in part on the feasibility of farmers and 
public authorities entering into cost minimising side deals to shift conservation 
obligations between the two groups. For example, the model developed in Section 2.1 
illustrates that even if one assumes that the entire gap between the current level of 
degradation in farming regions and the socially optimal level was due solely to 
environmental damage associated with farming activities, there is no strong efficiency 
case for saying that farmers should be held liable for all conservation activities 
necessary to achieve the social optimal. In a Coasian world, making farmers fully 
liable would produce a socially optimal outcome. However, the same optimal 
  14outcome would be produced if farmers faced a zero liability. In this context any 
decision to make farmers liable for more conservation activities must rest on non-
efficiency objectives. 
 
The pursuit of non-efficiency objectives in tandem with efficiency goals through the 
use on one policy instrument is fraught with dangers and is inconsistent with the 
Tinbergen Principle. In Australia there is an elaborate and explicit taxation and 
welfare payment system for directly dealing with equity or distributional issues. It is 
questionable that manipulation of individual resource management initiatives to 
achieve distributional goals can really improve on the distributional outcomes 
achieved by an efficient resource market and an economy wide redistribution system. 
Moreover, if there are problems in the taxation or welfare payments system it would 
probably be more appropriate to address them directly rather than in an ad hoc policy 
by policy basis. 
 
One of the dangers in trying to use environmental policy to achieve distributional 
goals is that the policy process may become dominated by rent seeking activities 
(Anderson 2004). The allocation of property rights between farmers and other 
potentially competing users of natural resources has the potential to have significant 
wealth effects. The discussion of applying Polluter Pays or Beneficiary Pays may well 
be more about bidding for rents rather than either efficient resource use or 
distributional equity. In this context, the use of established precedents on liability has 
the advantage of predictability and as a consequence, could be expected to be 
consistent with reduced disputes over resource use 
 
The model developed in Section 2.2 illustrates that in the presence of high transaction 
costs it is critical to base relative liabilities on comparative conservation costs rather 
than notions of such as distributive justice or polluter pays. At the extreme, adopting a 
policy of making one party liable for all costs (even if they are the polluter) has been 
shown to have the potential to produce a sub-optimal level of expenditure on 
conservation. 
 
In a world where transaction costs are high making it difficult to negotiate and or 
enforce side deals between farmers and the rest of the community, and farmers have 
  15no way of avoiding their obligations, there is a unique social optimum with respect to 
legal obligations for farmers. In our models this is equal to C6 units of resource 
management. Any other level of obligation, either greater or smaller, would be 
suboptimal in terms of either the cost of achieving the target or the extent of the 
conservation undertaken. 
 
While the Australian agricultural sector is not without significant transaction costs, 
there clearly exist some opportunities for farmers and the rest of society to negotiate 
and alter the mix of resource management effort. The extent of these opportunities is 
changing over time and depends in part on the policies and regulations that are put in 
place. In Australia an example of a new initiative which offers the potential to realise 
some of the gains from taking advantage of differences in conservation costs between 
farmers and public agencies is the Bush Tender scheme (Stoneham et al., 2003). 
Apart from demonstrating how to gain from differences in conservation costs, this 
scheme illustrates that in the Australian legal and political systems there is no binding 
nexus between the socially efficient distribution of conservation activities and the 
socially efficient distribution of the legal obligation to undertake resource 
management.  
 
The Bush Tender scheme involves the public sector entering into contracts with 
individuals to fund private on-farm conservation. Conservation funding also runs 
from the farm sector to the public sector with farmers funding conservation activities 
by the public sector through the tax system. In addition there have been examples 
where farmers have paid conservation levies to regional catchment management 
authorities to fund public off-farm conservation activities.  
 
In the final analysis it is clear that if society does demand a higher level of 
expenditure on natural resource management issues in farming regions the money will 
have to come from either farmers or the wider community. The purpose of this paper 
has been to show that there is no strong efficiency case for arguing that farmers 
should be the ones that pay. From an efficiency perspective the key questions are 
what conservation needs to take place and who should carry it out. The question of 
who should pay is entirely different. This decision on the later question will likely rest 
largely on notions of political acceptability.  
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The Responsiveness of Farmer and Public Conservation to Expectations of 
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